广东省贸易摩擦应对综合服务平台
（海外知识产权）

“ParkerVision’s petition argued that a ‘reason-giving’ opinion need not deluge the court and that ‘the Federal Circuit would satisfy § 144 by issuing a one-paragraph document identifying the grounds for reversal or vacatur that the appellant has raised and stating why they fail.’”

“ParkerVision 的请愿书认为，说明理由的意见不至于给法院增加过重的负担，联邦巡回法院只需发布一段文件，指明上诉人提出的推翻或撤销理由，并说明这些理由为何不成立，即可满足第 144 节的要求”。

The Supreme Court today nixed several high-profile IP petitions, including two that touch on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (CAFC’s) controversial use of one-word affirmances under Rule 36.

最高法院今天驳回了几项备受瞩目的知识产权申请，其中两项涉及美国联邦巡回上诉法院（CAFC）根据第 36 条规则使用仅用一个词确认的争议性做法。

Rule 36

第 36 条

In ParkerVision v. TCL Industries Holdings Co., Ltd., ParkerVision petitioned the High Court in November 2024 asking the justices whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (CAFC’s) habit of issuing one-word affirmances under Rule 36(a) is prohibited under 35 U.S.C. § 144.

在 ParkerVision 诉 TCL Industries Holdings Co., Ltd. 案中，ParkerVision 于 2024 年 11 月向最高法院提起诉愿，询问大法官美国联邦巡回上诉法院（CAFC）根据第 36(a)条发布一字肯定的习惯是否为《美国法典》第 35 编第 144 条所禁止。

The underlying cases stem from appeals of two Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) decisions in which the Board invalidated all challenged claims of ParkerVision’s U.S. Patent Nos. 7,292,835 and 7,110,444, geared generally to advanced wireless solutions for communications networks. The Federal Circuit issued two separate Rule 36 judgments on June 5, 2024, affirming the PTAB’s analyses with no explanation. The court’s use of Rule 36 has increased in recent years and is a controversial subject.

相关案件源于对专利审判和上诉委员会（PTAB）两项裁决的上诉，在这两项裁决中，委员会宣布 ParkerVision 的美国专利号 7,292,835 和 7,110,444 中所有受质疑的权利要求无效。联邦巡回法院于 2024 年 6 月 5 日发布了两份独立的第 36 条判决，在未作任何解释的情况下确认了专利复审委员会的分析。近年来，联邦巡回法院越来越多地使用第36条规则，这也是一个颇具争议的问题。

According to the petition, the CAFC’s first Chief Judge, the Honorable Howard T. Markey, during the First Annual Judicial Conference of the CAFC, specifically said: “In our Court there will be an opinion explaining enough to tell you what the law is in every case…. We do not just render a one-worded decision and go away.” And 35 U.S.C. § 144 requires the court to issue “opinions,” which has been historically defined as “a court’s statement of reasons for its decision.”

根据请愿书，CAFC 的第一任首席法官 Howard T. Markey 阁下在 CAFC 第一届年度司法会议上特别指出："在我们的法院中，将有一份意见书足以说明每个案件中的法律是什么： "在我们的法庭上，会有一份意见书，足以解释每个案件中的法律....。我们不会只做出仅用一个词的裁决就走人"。美国法典》第 35 篇第 144 节要求法院发表 “意见”，而 “意见 ”历来被定义为 “法院对其判决理由的陈述”。

While the theory is that the use of Rule 36 is justified due to the significant increase in cases the CAFC has seen following the America Invents Act’s creation of the PTAB, the petition argued that a “reason-giving” opinion need not deluge the court and that “the Federal Circuit would satisfy § 144 by issuing a one-paragraph document identifying the grounds for reversal or vacatur that the appellant has raised and stating why they fail.”

虽然从理论上讲，由于《美国发明法案》设立了专利与商标评审委员会（PTAB）后，联邦巡回法院的案件数量大幅增加，使用第36条规则是合理的，但请愿书认为，“说明理由 ”的意见不必淹没整个法院，“联邦巡回法院只需发布一段文件，指出上诉人提出的推翻或撤销理由，并说明这些理由为何不成立，即可满足第144条的要求”。

Also denied today was the petition in Island Intellectual Property LLC v. TD Ameritrade, Inc., which in part asked the Court whether it’s “proper for the Federal Circuit to use its own unique Local Rule 36 to affirm district court rulings with one-word decisions lacking explanation or analysis, when the grounds for affirmance are unclear in view of the arguments made on appeal?” The petition also challenged the courts’ use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on summary judgment procedures, arguing that both district courts and the Federal Circuit are misusing federal and local rules in a manner that results in summary affirmance of flawed determinations made at the summary judgment stage. Island IP also filed an amicus brief in ParkerVision’s Supreme court bid asking the Court to consider the two cases in conjunction.

今天被驳回的还有Island Intellectual Property LLC v. TD Ameritrade, Inc.一案的请愿书，其中部分内容是询问法院，"联邦巡回法院使用自己独特的地方规则第36条，以缺乏解释或分析的一字决定来确认地区法院的裁决，当确认的理由在上诉中提出的论点不明确时，这样做是否恰当？请愿书还对法院在简易判决程序中使用《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》第 56 条提出质疑，认为地区法院和联邦巡回法院都在滥用联邦和地方规则，导致在简易判决阶段做出的有缺陷的裁定得到简易确认。Island IP 还在 ParkerVision 诉最高法院一案中提交了法庭之友书状，要求法院一并审理这两起案件。

Jurisdiction

管辖权

In Lighting Defense Group (LDG) v. Snaprays (dba SnapPower), the CAFC reversed a district court’s decision in May 2024, finding that LDG purposefully directed extra-judicial patent enforcement activities at SnapPower in Utah. LDG petitioned the Supreme Court in November 2024, asking the Court to answer the question “[w]hether a defendant subjects itself to personal jurisdiction anywhere a plaintiff operates simply because the defendant knows its out-of-forum conduct ‘would necessarily affect marketing, sales, and other activities’ within the forum…—even though the defendant has no contacts with the plaintiff or the forum whatsoever.” The petition argued that the CAFC’s ruling ultimately permits “patentees to be sued anywhere ‘a targeted seller operates.’”

在Lighting Defense Group (LDG) v. Snaprays (dba SnapPower)案中，CAFC于2024年5月推翻了地区法院的判决，认定LDG故意在犹他州对SnapPower进行司法外专利执法活动。LDG 于 2024 年 11 月向最高法院提出申请，要求法院回答 “被告是否仅仅因为知道其法庭外行为'必然会影响法庭内的营销、销售和其他活动'而在原告经营的任何地方是否应受属人管辖......--即使被告与原告或法庭没有任何联系 ”的问题。请愿书认为，联邦上诉法院的裁决最终允许 “专利权人在任何地方被起诉，‘目标销售商在任何地方经营’”。

Collateral Estoppel

附带禁止反言

Finally, the Court today also denied the petition in Koss Corp. v. Bose Corp., which stems from a July 2024 CAFC precedential ruling for Bose that dismissed as moot Koss’s appeal of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB’s) invalidation of certain wireless earphone patent claims due to a prior district court decision finding the claims patent ineligible. Koss sued Bose in Texas for patent infringement and on the same day also sued Plantronics, Inc. on the same patents. Bose subsequently petitioned for inter partes review of the patents and the PTAB found all of the asserted claims of two of the patents unpatentable, and some of the claims of a third unpatentable. Koss appealed and Bose cross-appealed the patentability findings, but the CAFC said that, because Koss agreed to dismissal of the Plantronics case with prejudice, without reserving a right of appeal, the district court’s invalidation of the claims is final, and not superseded by Koss’s Second Amended Complaint, as Koss argued.

最后，法院今天还驳回了Koss Corp.诉Bose Corp.一案的请求，该案源于2024年7月CAFC对Bose做出的一项先例性裁决，该裁决驳回了Koss对专利审判与上诉委员会（PTAB）认定无线耳机某些专利权利要求不具备专利资格而宣布其无效的上诉，以争议已消失为由驳回。Koss 在德克萨斯州起诉 Bose 专利侵权，并于同一天就相同专利起诉 Plantronics, Inc. Bose 随后申请对这些专利进行双方复审，而专利复审委员会认定其中两项专利的所有主张均不具备专利性，第三项专利的部分主张也不具备专利性。Koss提起上诉，Bose也对专利性结论提起交叉上诉，但联邦上诉法院称，由于Koss同意在不影响诉讼结果的情况下驳回Plantronics的诉讼请求，且未保留上诉权，因此地区法院对权利要求的无效宣告是终审判决，而非如Koss所辩称的那样被Koss的第二次修正申诉所取代。

Koss’s petition asked: “When a district court grants a Rule-12(b)(6) motion to dismiss but does so without prejudice and with leave to amend, may that non-merits determination be given collateral-estoppel effect on the theory that it merged into a later with-prejudice dismissal stipulation?”

Koss 的请愿书提出以下问题：“当地区法院批准依据联邦民事诉讼规则 12(b)(6) 提出的驳回动议，但驳回决定是不涉及案件实质的、不带偏见（without prejudice），并允许修改诉状（with leave to amend）时，该决定是否可以在后续带有偏见（with-prejudice）的驳回协议中被视为已合并其中，并因此具有‘禁止反言’（collateral estoppel）效力？”